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Abstract
Normatively and intuitively, we conceive of political participation as an integral component of
democratic policymaking. However, research on participation generally does not include policy
considerations as part of individuals’ decisions to engage in activism. I o er an Opportunity
Model of participation that begins to study how policy goals shape individual participation and
how aggregate participation shapes policymaking. The central argument is that individuals’
policy goals allow them to recognize those moments when it is most e cient and/or e ective to
take action. Examining black participation from 1980 to 1994, I show that black Americans are
more likely to participate when they face external threats, are embedded in social networks, and
have greater access to policymakers. Most importantly, the recognition of these opportunities
varies according to individuals’ resources. This research moves beyond the discussion of who
participates to address the equally fundamental question: participation for what?
 I would like to thank Fredrick Harris, Valeria Sinclair-Chapman, Richard Niemi, Kevin Clarke, Gerald Gamm,
James Endersby, Paul Martin, Arthur Spirling, David Carter, and Eduardo Leoni for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper; Janet Box-Ste ensmeier for data; and the star lab for use of its resources in the writing and
analysis of this paper. The normal caveat applies.
†Department of Political Science; University of Rochester; plat@mail.rochester.eduThe aim of participation research is (or at least should be) to connect individuals’ participation
decisions to policy outcomes. Normatively, we view the political activity of citizens as an essential
element of a democratic policy process (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 1-2). Intuitively, we
think that individuals engage in political actions because they want to inﬂuence policymaking.
Yet, the dominant theories of political participation do not include policy considerations as part of
individuals’ decisions to take action (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). As
a result, our extensive knowledge about who participates is divorced from the equally fundamental
question of why people participate: participation for what? I address this fundamental question by
devising an opportunity model of policy-motivated participation, and then I apply that model to
black politics. The research is guided by two questions: how do social, economic, and political envi-
ronments shape black participation decisions, and what are the consequences of black participation
for congressional responsiveness to black issues?
Addressing these questions contributes to a growing literature that integrates political partici-
pation into larger discussions of how individual behavior is shaped by exogenous events. The foun-
dational work in participation explains how individual characteristics are critical for understanding
political activity in some generic democracy (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Conversely,
social movements research emphasizes how speciﬁc macro-contextual features inﬂuence aggregate
mobilization (Schussman and Soule (2005) is a notable exception). This paper joins more recent
scholarship that transforms the standard model of generic democracy into a contextualized politi-
cal world involving disparities in local services (Marschall 2001, 2004), anti-terrorism policies (Cho,
Gimpel and Wu 2006), and descriptive representation (Gri n and Keane 2006). These studies make
the point that political participation is not the result of personal characteristics or macro-context;
it is the result of the interactions between these factors.
I extend this research by asserting that participation decisions are shaped by political oppor-
tunities – recognized links between changes in broad contextual environments and an individual’s
policy concerns (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Meyer 2004). Rational activists
should participate when economic, social, and political conditions are more favorable to the realiza-
tion of their policy goals. Black Americans’ shared racial identity and sense of “linked fate” create
1a common core of black issue concerns (Walton 1985; Dawson 1994; Walton and Smith 2003), so
the participation decisions of black individuals should change according to opportunities for re-
sponsiveness to black policy demands. Examining individual-level data on black participation from
1980 to 1994, I show that black Americans are more politically active when they face some external
threat, have greater access to policymakers, and there are stronger social networks. In addition,
these e ects are contingent upon individuals’ education and income. However, in the aggregate,
this policy-motivated black participation has no signiﬁcant impact on congressional attention to
black issues.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in ﬁve sections. Section 1 presents the Opportunity Model
of participation and applies it to black politics. Section 2 details how black participation, political
opportunities, and congressional responsiveness to black issues are measured. In addition, this sec-
tion discusses the two separate data analyses for investigating the impact of opportunities on black
participation and the policy consequences of that participation. Section 3 presents the core ﬁndings
from this analysis, and Section 4 concludes with some of the contributions this research makes to
our understandings of political participation and black politics. The message is straightforward:
political opportunities shape policy-motivated activism, but that activism does not necessarily yield
policy results.
1 An Opportunity Model of Participation
The Opportunity Model of participation is based on the simple assumption that individuals engage
in political action because they want to inﬂuence policy.1 Given this assumption, we should expect
individuals to strategically participate when it is relatively more e ective and/or e cient to do so;
when the ratio of beneﬁts to costs is higher. Opportunities are those contextual features that set the
cost/beneﬁt constraints within which participation decisions are made. More broadly, “constraints”
1Although collective action problems (Olson 1971) and the calculus of participation (Riker and Ordeshook 1968)
have rendered this assumption highly dubious, the literature has pushed against these concerns over the past ﬁfteen
years. Game theoretic formulations of participation have shown how information cascades can overcome collective
action problems (Lohmann 1993, 1994), and Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1995) demonstrate empirically that
individual participation is motivated by collective interests. However, research has also shown that many people
participate for social rather than policy beneﬁts.
2can also be thought of as the individual-level attributes highlighted by the Civic Voluntarism Model
– resources, political engagement, and recruitment (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). An open
opportunity is characterized by fewer constraints on activity – higher ratios of beneﬁts to costs, more
resources, greater political engagement, and/or higher levels of recruitment activity. Conversely, a
closed opportunity more strictly constrains individuals’ participation decisions. People should be
more likely to take action when there are open opportunities, and they should be less likely to take
action when there are closed opportunities.
However, as any high school guidance counselor knows, opportunities are worthless if nobody
takes advantage of them. In social movements research, political opportunities are conceptualized
as being speciﬁc to certain tactics and certain movements (Meyer 2004). As such, McAdam, Tarrow
and Tilly (2001) argue that opportunities must be recognized before mobilization can occur, and
this recognition varies according to how individuals identify themselves. I use the recognition of
opportunities to incorporate policy considerations into participation decisions. Namely, individuals’
policy concerns form the basis of the identity that is used to recognize open and closed opportunities.
I argue that individuals who identify with similar policy demands comprise informal (and sometimes
formal) constituencies of interests, and the size of these constituencies ﬂuctuates according to the
opportunities arising from larger social, political, and economic environments. Black Americans’
shared racial identity and historical experience with racial injustice has fostered a sense of “linked
fate,” and as a result, black Americans generally adhere to a common core of policy interests
that can be classiﬁed as “black issues” (Walton 1985; Dawson 1994; Tate 1994; Walton and Smith
2003). The Opportunity Model of participation states that this common policy identity should
allow individual black civic activism to be shaped by the opening and closing of opportunities. In
this paper, I focus on three types of opportunity: external threats, access, and social networks.
1.1 External Threats
An external threat allows individuals to tap into their group identity and rally for renewed, more
innovative e orts (Dyke and Soule 2002; Dyke 2003; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). As a
result of tapping into this group identity, political interest increases, and people are more likely
3to participate. In the participation literature, this idea is best expressed through the role blame
attribution plays in studies of economic voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Feldman 1982; Arceneaux
2003). Welch and Foster (1992) show that this role is further enhanced by black Americans’
group consciousness, which places the blame on institutional rather than individual failings. Tate
(1994, 118-121) argues that Ronald Reagan’s administration served as such an external threat,
leading to a record high black turnout in the 1984 election. Looking at cumulative data from the
National Election Studies, there is some empirical evidence that black Americans were particularly
dissatisﬁed with the Reagan administration. Of the four Republican presidents between 1968 and
2000 (Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and H.W. Bush), only Nixon has a lower mean rating on the feeling
thermometer. However, Reagan’s mean thermometer ratings sport an 18 point di erence between
white and black respondents while ratings for the other three candidates only show an 11 point
di erence by race. The implication is that Reagan was disproportionately viewed negatively by
black people.
This apprehension was not without cause. Reagan’s poor record on civil rights – particularly
his vetoes of the Martin Luther King Holiday and sanctions against apartheid – have been well
documented by previous research (Walton 1988; Smith 1996). In addition, the unemployment rate
for black Americans was, on average, twice the rate for the nation as a whole (15.5% compared
to 7.5%). The poverty rate for black people grew during Reagan’s ﬁrst three years in o ce (from
32.5 in 1980 to 35.7 in 1983), and crack cocaine emerged during the 1980s, devastating the lives of
many poor black people in America’s cities.2 Although Reagan is certainly not responsible for all
of these negative trends a ecting black Americans in the 1980s, his administration bore much of
the blame nonetheless.
Hypothesis 1: The Reagan administration was an external threat to black Americans, so black
people will be more likely to participate when Reagan is in o ce.
2Data provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Supplements. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration lists the beginning of the crack epidemic as 1984, but the
ﬁrst instances of “crack houses” occurred in Miami in 1982.
41.2 Access Opportunities
Access refers to those moments when either the government is particularly responsive to a given
group or when there are movement allies in positions of power. Generally, access opportunities
raise the ratio of beneﬁts to costs because less activity is required to achieve policy outcomes (Cress
and Snow 2000; Amenta, Olasky and Caren 2005). In terms of having allies in positions of power,
the literature on minority participation conceives of access opportunities as political empowerment.
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that black mayors empowered their black constituents by increasing
their levels of political trust, knowledge, and e cacy. As a result, black Americans participated at
higher rates when they lived in a city with a black mayor. Later work has expanded these ﬁndings
to show the participatory beneﬁts of descriptive representation for black people, latinos, and women
at all levels of government (Gay 2001, 2002; Lawless 2004; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Gri n
and Keane 2006). However, the race and representation literature emphasizes the importance of
substantive representation (Swain 1995; Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997), so
black Americans may also ﬁnd allies in the form of liberal Democrats who are receptive to black
policy demands.
Hypothesis 2: Having allies in Congress is an access opportunity for black Americans, so black
people will be more likely to participate as the number of congressional allies increases.
As stated above, access refers to more than just having allies in positions of power. An access
opportunity also refers to when the government or broader public is more receptive to addressing
certain issues. McCammon et al. (2001) show that the Women’s Su rage Movement beneﬁtted
from exogenous changes in the nation’s perception of women’s roles. Similarly, Lee (2002) posits
that the success of the Civil Rights Movement was due to the endogenous process of altering public
opinion on black issues. Given that black issues are usually liberal policies that envision a larger
role for the federal government (Hamilton and Hamilton 1997; Walton and Smith 2003), rising
conservatism could pose a closed opportunity to black Americans.
Hypothesis 3: A receptive public mood is an access opportunity for black Americans, so they will
5be less likely to participate as the nation becomes more conservative.
1.3 The Importance of Networks
Social networks make mobilization more e cient, di use tactics across organizations, and foster
the group identities that are activated by external threats (Morris 1984; McAdam and Paulsen
1993; Soule 1997; McAdam 1999). The participation literature asserts that social and information
networks raise individuals’ levels of political interest and knowledge, increasing their likelihood of
engaging in activism (Johnson, Stein and Wrinkle 2003; McClurg 2003; Bowers 2004; Cho, Gimpel
and Dyck 2006). Furthermore, Cho (2003) shows that campaign contributions by Asians follows a
pattern of di usion, and Kenny (1992) ﬁnds that people participate more when they are part of an
active social network. The relationship between networks and participation is ampliﬁed in black
politics. Interaction among black people socializes them to link their own fate with that of the
larger black community. Given the prevalence of racial frames in these interactions, black people
are then able to take the cognitive shortcut of basing political decisions on group concerns rather
than individual concerns (Walton 1985; Dawson 1994; Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie
2006). As a result, black peoples’ political orientations – various combinations of trust and e cacy
– are more conducive to participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Guterbock and London
1983; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989; Mangum 2003; Southwell and Pirch 2003). 3
Hypothesis 4: Black Americans who are part of social networks are more likely to participate than
those who are not embedded in networks.
The Opportunity Model of participation predicts that the common policy interests of black
Americans will lead them to recognize changes in threat, access, and network opportunities. How-
ever, nothing has been said about the consequences of that participation for congressional respon-
siveness to black issues. Previous work has demonstrated theoretically that political participation
serves as a signalling device to policymakers (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Kollman 1998). The
basic idea is that legislators want to govern in the majority’s interest, but they are uninformed
about what that interest actually is. High levels of activism in favor or in opposition to a policy
3There is some debate as to which combination of trust and e cacy has the greater impact on black participation.
6serves to inform policymakers about the preferences of the general public, and then they enact poli-
cies accordingly (Lohmann 1993). Mobilization in these models usually follows the leader-driven
approach adopted by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). The Opportunity Model of participation is
more in line with the work of Lohmann (1994), who shows how large-scale activism occurs in the
absence of a mobilizing leader or organization. When black Americans’ common policy interests
lead them to recognize the opening of access opportunities, then they should participate at higher
rates. These heightened levels of black participation signal the salience and credibility of black
issues to Congress, which responds with greater attention to black issues.
Hypothesis 5: Rising levels of aggregate black participation should lead to greater congressional
attention to black issues.
2 Data and Methods
In order to evaluate these ﬁve hypotheses we need measures of participation, external threats,
access, social networks, and congressional responsiveness. The ﬁrst – and most important – task
is to ﬁnd suitable measures of participation. Studies of participation are generally interested in
who participates more, so they measure political activity through some type of index. Conversely,
the Opportunity Model posits that certain individuals should engage in certain types of activity at
certain times, so rather than creating an index of participation, I am interested in the binary choice
to engage in a form of activism.4 In order to capture variation in the opportunities that structure
these binary choices, I also need data on individuals’ participation decisions over some period of
time. Both of these concerns are addressed by the Roper Social and Political Trends data, which
includes almost monthly survey questions about the political activities of respondents from 1980
to 1994 (Brady, Putnam et al. 2001).
The Roper Center asks about twelve activities.5 Of these twelve forms of participation, ﬁve
4The idea is to examine how the e ects of opportunities vary across di erent forms of activity. That variation
would be lost in a participation scale.
5The Roper Survey asks respondents “Now here is a list of things some people do about government or politics.
Have you happened to have done any of those things in the past year?” The twelve activities are: contacting a
member of Congress, attending a public meeting on local a airs, attending a political rally, seeking/holding political
o ce, writing a letter to a newspaper, signing a petition, working for a political party, making a speech, serving
7relate to individual e orts to communicate one’s preferences – contacting a member of Congress,
attending a public meeting, writing a letter to a periodical, writing an article for a periodical, and
making a speech. Three activities are concerned with organizational a liation and service – serving
on a committee in a local organization, serving as an o cer for a club or organization, and being
a member of a “good government” organization. Lastly, there are three forms of participation
that incorporate individual e orts into some broader collective action – attending a political rally,
working for a political party, and signing a petition. Given the impracticality of analyzing how all
of these activities are shaped by opportunities and in turn inﬂuence congressional attention, I focus
on these last three acts that involve collective e orts to inﬂuence policy.
The Opportunity Model emphasizes how individuals independently combine their activity into
constituencies of interests. Signing petitions, working for parties, and attending rallies are all in-
dividual choices to engage in a collective enterprize of inﬂuencing policy. Arguably, contacting a
member of Congress could be part of a larger letter-writing campaign. However, much of citizens’
interactions with members of Congress deal with requests for more individualized casework (Fenno
1978). Writing articles, letters, or speeches do not necessarily involve any attempt to sway pol-
icymakers. Indeed, these e orts are generally aimed at expanding knowledge or public support
around an issue. Petitions, rallies, and party work are explicitly geared toward inﬂuencing the who
and how of policymaking.6 Thus, there are three dependent variables for black individuals’ partic-
ipation decisions: separate binary indicators for whether a respondent signed a petition, attended
a political rally, and worked for a political party. In order to examine black participation more
generally, I include a binary measure of whether a respondent engaged in at least one of the nine
non-organizational forms of participation as a fourth dependent variable.
I hypothesize that these four measures of black participation are shaped by external threats,
access opportunities, and social networks. The Reagan administration has already been highlighted
on a committee in a local organization, serving as an o cer for a club or organization, being a member of a “good
government” organization, or writing an article for a periodical.
6This explanation would suggest that voting or protest should also be included as dependent variables. Unlike
the three activities I focus upon, individuals do not have control over when they have the option to vote. I am
interested in individual choices when there is relatively little governmental structure dictating their choices. Protest
ﬁts within the type of activity that is the subject of this research. From a practical point of view, there is no data
on individual decisions to protest that covers a meaningful span of time. For these reasons, I analyze non-voting,
non-protest participation.
8as a threat to black Americans during the period of this study, 1980-1994. As an independent vari-
able, I measure the Reagan threat (labeled “Reagan Threat”) as a dichotomous variable taking a
value of one when Ronald Reagan is in o ce. However, there should be some way to distinguish
between the general di culties black people faced during the Reagan administration and the eco-
nomic di culties that disproportionately harmed black Americans during Reagan’s ﬁrst term. The
black unemployment rate, which is usually double the rate of unemployment generally, is a good
indicator of the disparate e ects that economic downturns can have on black people, so I include
it as a second measure of external threats. This independent variable (labeled “Black Unemploy-
ment”) is the quarterly seasonally adjusted rate for black Americans reported by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. When there are more external threats – black unemployment rises and/or Reagan
is in o ce – black people should be more likely to participate.
In the above discussion, access opportunities were conceived in two ways: having allies in po-
sitions of power and favorable public sentiment. There are two measures of allies. To capture the
idea that descriptive black representatives provide enhanced legislative service to black Americans,
I include the number of black members of Congress who hold committee or subcommittee chairman-
ships as an independent variable (labeled “Black Chairs”). However, the race and representation
literature also highlights the role of substantive representation, which does not necessarily require
black members of Congress. This concept is operationalized as the quarterly number of black issue
bills introduced in Congress (labeled “Black Bills”).7 The second hypothesis for access oppor-
tunities (Hypothesis 4) involved conservatism. I use the quarterly percentage of Americans who
self-identify as conservative according to monthly polls by CBS News/New York Times as an in-
dependent variable that measures conservatism (labeled “Percent Conservative”). When there are
open access opportunities – increased allies, more black bills, and lower percentages of conservatives
– black people should be more likely to participate.
While the other opportunities have been measured at the aggregate level, social networks are
operationalized as an individual-level variable. I measure social networks as a dichotomous variable
(labeled “Organizational Activity”) taking a value of one for respondents who engage in at least
7This measure was constructed by searching the Library of Congress’s Thomas server under the subject term
“blacks.”
9one of the following activities: served on a committee for a local organization, served as an o cer
in an organization or club, or was a member of a good government organization. Basically, rather
than trying to gauge the strength of black social networks in some aggregate sense (such as church
attendance or NAACP membership), I am interested in whether an individual is engaged in social
networking. Black people who are part of social networks will be more likely to participate. Finally,
since the Opportunity Model asserts that opportunities interact with the constraints of participa-
tion, I include standard individual-level characteristics – age, household income, and education
level.
From this discussion of the data, we see that there are four binary dependent variables that
are functions of both aggregate- and individual-level explanatory variables. I employ a two-stage
random e ects logit developed by Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994). First, separate logit models are
estimated for each quarter from 1980 to 1994. These models regress participation on age, household
income, education, and organizational activity, yielding 58 estimated coe cients for these four
variables and the intercept. Second, OLS is used to regress these 58 coe cients on the aggregate-
level variables (Reagan threat, black unemployment rate, number of allies, number of black bills,
and percent conservatives)8, and that is done for all ﬁve of the variables from the ﬁrst stage
(the intercept, age, education, household income, and organizational activity). The basic idea is
to estimate the macro- and micro-level e ects in separate steps. That is, the ﬁrst step of the
estimation provides the average e ects for each time unit, and the second step treats these average
e ects as linear functions of unit-varying factors.9 This creates a fully interactive model capable of
teasing out variations in responses to opportunities.
Estimating the e ects of opportunities on black participation is only half of the analytical task.
The other half is to estimate the impact of aggregate black participation on congressional attention
to black issues. As an independent variable, aggregate black participation is measured as the
quarterly proportion of respondents who sign petitions, attend rallies, or work for parties. Due
8The Roper Survey asks respondents “Now here is a list of things some people do about government or politics.
Have you happened to have done any of those things in the past year?” As a result of this wording, the aggregate
variables are lagged by four quarters.
9As with any multi-stage analysis, I make the requisite corrections to the covariance matrices highlighted by
Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005).
10to the high collinearity between these measures of participation, I run four separate models – one
for each measure of aggregate participation. In addition to aggregate black participation, I specify
congressional attention as a function of access opportunities, so the number of black committee and
subcommittee chairs, the number of black issue bills, and the percent of conservative identiﬁers
are included as explanatory variables. Following the standard convention in the agenda setting
literature (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Sheingate 2006), I measure
congressional attention as the quarterly count of hearings held on black issues.10 Given that the
dependent variable is a count, the relationship between congressional hearings and aggregate black
participation is analyzed using a poisson count model.11 I have argued that policy-motivated black
participation is governed by the political opportunity structure. Now that claim can be assessed.
3 Results
As stated above, the ﬁrst portion of the data analysis is to understand how opportunities shape
black participation. Since I have estimated a fully interactive logit model of individual participation,
the interpretation of coe cients is not entirely straightforward. In order to ease the presentation of
results, tables of coe cients are relegated to the appendix. Instead Table 1 presents ﬁrst di erences
in the predicted probabilities of black participation.12 For example, the entry in the seventh row
and ﬁrst column shows that a one-unit increase in education raises the probability of engaging in at
least one of the nine acts on the Roper Survey by 0.174. The parentheses show the 95% conﬁdence
boundaries, so in this case the change in probability is statistically signiﬁcant.13 In general, edu-
cation and income behave as expected from the standard ﬁndings in the participation literature.
More educated black people are more likely to sign petitions, work for a political party, or attend
a political rally. By the same token, those with higher incomes participate more overall and are
10This measure was constructed using a Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe search for the keyword “blacks.”
11Diagnostics showed that the hearings were independent, and there were no signs of over-dispersion when the
models were ran using a negative binomial.
12First di erences for education, age, and organization represent a one-unit change. The remaining variables
represent changes of one standard deviation from the mean.
13First di erences and conﬁdence intervals were calculated using the CLARIFY procedure (though not the actual
program) outlined by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000). The baseline proﬁle that these changes are compared to
is a black person between the ages of 35-39 with a high school education who earns $12,242.41 (in 1982 dollars) and
is not a liated with an organization.
11more likely to sign petitions. However, there is some divergence from the usual ﬁndings for age and
income. There is no relationship between an individual’s age and the probability of participation,
and income does not appear to inﬂuence decisions to work for a political party or attend a political
rally. These ﬁndings highlight the value of looking at the types of participation separately. Age
is an important factor for voting, but has no e ect on non-voting black participation. Similarly,
both party work and rally attendance require a willingness to volunteer one’s time that, apparently,
does not correspond to having a higher income. Still, this paper is primarily interested in the role
opportunities play in black participation decisions.
[Table 1 about here.]
There are three types of opportunities: external threats, access, and social networks. I argued
that rising unemployment and the turbulence of the Reagan years (at least from the perspective of
black Americans) constituted external threats that use a common racial identity to galvanize black
people. That certainly appears to be the case for the Reagan Threat. During his administration,
black people were more likely to participate in all three forms of activity. Unemployment presents
a di erent story; it seems to have no e ect on rates of black participation. Rather than responding
to tangible Reaganomic di culties (such as high unemployment), it is the more general problems,
such as civil rights enforcement and the crack epidemic, that result in higher probabilities of black
participation.
Access opportunities were measured as general conservatism, congressional allies, and the intro-
duction of black issue bills in Congress. Interestingly, access opportunities only inﬂuence decisions
to work for political parties. As expected, there is a slight decline in the probability of working for
a political party when a larger percentage of the nation identiﬁes as conservative, and the prob-
ability of party work increases when more black issue bills are introduced in Congress. However,
increasing the number of black people who hold committee or subcommittee chairs leads to a small
decrease in participation. Though unexpected, this ﬁnding reﬂects theoretical developments within
the social movements literature. After a certain point, entrenched allies provide su cient access
to preclude political activity (Soule and Zylan 1997; Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone 2003; Amenta,
Olasky and Caren 2005). Conversely, the type of legislative support supplied through favorable
12bill introductions is held as providing increased access without lessening the need for participation
altogether (McAdam 1999; Cress and Snow 2000). In either case, the relatively small substan-
tive e ects suggest that access opportunities do not have broad inﬂuence over black Americans’
decisions to engage in activism.
Contrary to access opportunities, social networks are a comprehensive boon to black partici-
pation. Basically, black individuals who are embedded in social networks are substantially more
active than those who operate outside of these networks. On average, being a liated with an
organization raises the probability of participating in at least one act by 0.826 (meaning that it
is a virtual certainty), and being involved in organized networks raises the probability of signing
petitions, working for political parties, and attending rallies by 0.341, 0.027, and 0.157 respectively.
These ﬁndings are in accord with the argument in Leighley (1996) that organizations contribute to
an unintentional mobilization of political activity.
Table 1 also provides insight into di erences across the types of participation. The importance
of external threats to individuals’ decisions to attend rallies may reﬂect the importance of political
rallies as articulations of grievances. However, working for political parties could be more instru-
mental in shaping policy, so opportunities that determine access to policymakers play a greater
role in decisions to engage in party work. Conceiving of political acts as serving distinct policy
purposes may also explain the null ﬁndings for overall participation. As a mix of di erent types of
participation that serve di erent roles, speciﬁc opportunities should not have any systematic e ect,
which is what Table 1 reveals for access opportunities and the threat of unemployment. Finally,
social interaction is so essential to black participation, and the Reagan threat was so pervasive that
individuals were driven to higher levels of activity – regardless of the type of political act. Although
these explanations are merely conjectures, they reﬂect the sorts of insights that are possible through
a policy-motivated approach to participation research.
3.1 Opportunities for Interaction
The Opportunity Model emphasizes that the recognition of opportunities depends upon individual
identity. In this sense, it is not enough to know what the general e ects of opportunities are. We
13also need insight into how the e ects of changes in social, political, and economic environments vary
according to individuals’ characteristics. Tables 2-4 present the interaction between opportunities
and three individual-level characteristics: organizational a liation, education, and income.
[Table 2 about here.]
As with Table 1, the cell entries for these three tables are the change in probability compared
against the previously stated baseline. The top row shows the e ect on participation when only the
individual-level variable changes, and the subsequent rows are the e ect when both the individual-
level characteristic and the opportunity variable change. Entries in bold mean that the impact
of the individual-level variable is enhanced by the interaction with an opportunity variable. For
example, Table 2 demonstrates that rising black unemployment lessens the impact of social networks
on overall participation, but it enhances the value of social networks for higher rates of petition
signing.
Table 2 adds a layer of complexity to our previous ﬁndings about opportunities. With the excep-
tion of overall participation, black people who are embedded in organizational networks recognize
rising unemployment as an external threat, so the probabilities for signing petitions, working for
political parties, and attending rallies all increase in response to black unemployment rates. In a
counter-intuitive ﬁnding, black people with some organizational a liation are actually less likely to
participate in response to the Reagan administration than people who are not connected to social
networks. Lastly, the access variables follow a surprising pattern, given the results from Table 1.
Having more black committee chairs in Congress increases overall participation, petition signing,
and rally attendance. It seems that members of social networks have a better grasp of the strategic
logic. Black committee chairs imply a greater chance for rapid change, so organizationally a liated
individuals respond with higher levels of activity to take advantage of the opportunity. A more
striking pattern is observed for growing conservatism. Rather than recognizing conservatism as an
issue of access, those in social networks respond to growing conservatism as an external threat,
thus increasing the probability of participation.
Table 3 presents the interaction of education and opportunities. While there are a number of
interesting results here, I will restrict attention to unemployment, the Reagan threat, conservatism,
14and rally attendance. Black Americans who lack high levels of education have an intense reaction
to the Reagan administration as threatening their interests. However, the highly educated do not
respond to the general specter of Reagan himself; they respond to the negative policy consequences
associated with his administration – higher rates of black unemployment – and the increasing
conservatism that administration represents. If we assume that higher levels of education are a good
proxy for political knowledge, then Table 3 may present an interesting story about how political
knowledge or sophistication a ect the recognition of external threats. As stated above, politically
sophisticated black people view conservatism not as closed access but as a mobilizing threat. The
other interesting point is the di erence in the results for rally attendance in Tables 2 and 3. Being
part of social networks translated almost all opportunities into increased probabilities of attending
political rallies. However, with the exception of unemployment, higher levels of education translated
all opportunities into lower probabilities of attending political rallies. Organizations respond to
contextual developments with collective rallies. Those with higher levels of education invest their
participatory resources elsewhere.
[Table 3 about here.]
As stated above, age does not have a signiﬁcant e ect on any of the four measures of partici-
pation, and income is only relevant to the decisions for overall participation and petition signing.
Thus, Table 4 presents the interaction of income with opportunities for overall participation and
signing petitions. Unlike the nuanced, conditional relationships unveiled in Tables 2-3, higher in-
come produces an almost across the board spike in the probabilities of participating generally or
signing a petition. Interestingly, the presence of black committee and subcommittee chairs is an
exception to these positive e ects. Gri n and Keane (2006) ﬁnd that the participatory beneﬁts
of descriptive representation are conditioned on ideology. Perhaps black Americans with above-
average incomes are su ciently more conservative that they do not necessarily view black members
of Congress as their allies. However, as Dawson (1994) shows, those with higher incomes have not
lost touch with a sense of racial identity. Indeed, Gay (2004) shows that middle-class black people
are more militant on racial matters. As a result, higher income levels enhance the recognition of
external threats and black issue legislation, but the liberalism of black elected o cials diverges too
15much from the ideal points of more well-o  black Americans.
[Table 4 about here.]
Adopting the Opportunity Model approach to participation provides new angles of inquiry in terms
of the di erences between acts and individual-level resources. These di erences are obscured when
we do not focus on a broader politicized context.
3.2 From Policy Motivation to Policy Outcomes
Black Americans are more likely to engage in participation when they are attached to social net-
works, when they recognize racial threats and allies, and when there is a less-conservative political
climate. I have argued that participation serves as a signal to policymakers of credibility and
salience, so when more black people are active, congress should be more responsive to black is-
sues. Conversely, sparse participation should then send a signal that policy ideas are lacking in
either credibility or salience, and therefore are not worth the legislator’s resources (Lohmann 1993;
Austen-Smith and Wright 1994).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 lends some insight into the nature of the signal being sent by black participation. Figure
1(a) shows the predicted probability that a respondent will engage in at least one act of partici-
pation. Figure 1(b) is a similar plot of the probability that a respondent will have worked for a
political party. The relatively low levels of black participation displayed in these plots sow the seed
of doubt regarding the ability of black activism to force increased levels of policy responsiveness
from the government. Our ﬁnal task is to investigate whether policy-motivated black participation
leads to increased congressional attention to black issues.
[Table 5 about here.]
The results presented in Table 5 suggest that there is no relationship between black participation
and congressional attention to black issues. Due to the collinearity among the types of participation,
four separate models were ran for each form of political activity. Table 5 presents the coe cients
16and standard errors from the poisson estimation. Regardless of the form of political participation,
there is no relationship between aggregate activity and congressional responsiveness. This null
relationship could be indicative of the aforementioned failure to convince legislator’s of the worth
of black issues. However, the literature on white racial attitudes o ers an alternative explanation.
Studies of white racial attitudes argue that white Americans oppose racialized issues because these
group-speciﬁc issues are contrary to American ideals of individualism and hardwork (Sears, hensler
and Speer 1979; Sniderman et al. 1991; Tarman and Sears 2005). Furthermore, white opposition
to black issues is reinforced by beliefs in negative stereotypes about black people (Pe ey, Hurwitz
and Sniderman 1997; Virtanen and Huddy 1998). As a result of these two trends, black issues
will face entrenched white opposition unless they are framed in more universal terms (Sniderman
et al. 1996; Krysan 2000). I have argued that a racialized view of political, economic, and social
events are what allow black Americans to recognize political opportunities. Black participation
motivated by such racialized policy issues may trigger white opposition. The plausible result is a null
relationship between black activism and congressional responsiveness because black participation
has been drowned out by higher levels of white participation.
One way of making some sense of whether the white opposition argument is plausible is to
compare the participation rates for black and white people over time. If white people participate
at lower levels than their black counterparts, then a white opposition argument would not seem to
make much sense. Figure 2 shows the monthly rates of participation for white and black respondents
and the di erence between these rates from 1973 to 1994. The message from both Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) is that the white opposition argument cannot be ruled out by the data. White Americans
consistently participate at higher levels than black Americans. Interestingly, there is a marked
decline in the participation gap during the 1980s. Perhaps this is another indication of the broader
e ects I have associated with the Reagan administration. Nonetheless, it is quite possible that
black participation was simply overshadowed by white participation during this period, so we ﬁnd
no relationship between black activism and congressional attention to black issues. Although black
participation is policy-motivated, in the aggregate, it does not appear to produce policy outcomes.
[Figure 2 about here.]
174 Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted a full exploration of policy-motivated black participation. Using a
simple assumption that people participate to inﬂuence policy, we found that political opportunities
play an important role in individuals’ decisions to participate. Indeed, the impact of external
threats and access vary across the types of participatory activity as well as across levels of education,
income, and social network a liation. Black individuals are more likely to participate when there
is higher unemployment, during the Reagan administration, when they are part of social networks,
and when there is greater access to policymakers. Despite the impact of these policy-related factors
on black participation, aggregate black political activity was found to have no relationship with
congressional attention to black issues.
There are two important contributions this research makes to the study of political participation.
First, it o ers the Opportunity Model as a framework for future analyses of participation. This
policy-motivated approach di ers from the standard practice in participation research because it
examines individual types of activity, the primary explanatory variables are contextual rather than
at the individual level, and it tries to explore interactions between macro-context and individual
characteristics. Of course, this approach also brings a new set of data problems. We must have
data that allows for either temporal or spatial changes in opportunities, and there must be some
measure of policy-motivations. I have used race as a proxy for policy interests in this paper, but
the ideal would be to have a more exact measure of the intended consequences of political actions.
Second, I attempt to connect non-voting political participation to actual policy outcomes. This is
an important step for both the participation and agenda setting literatures. Understanding how
participation a ects policy would provide new insights into how participation decisions are actually
made. Similarly, scholars of agenda setting argue that the entrance of new participants into the
policy arena is crucial for placing new items on the agenda (Cobb and Elder 1972; Schattschneider
1975; Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976; Baumgartner and Jones 1993); however, there are not any studies
in this literature that empirically establish such a connection. Although I report only null ﬁndings
in this paper, it is still an important ﬁrst step toward linking political activity and policymaking.
Finally, this paper raises interesting questions for students of black politics. There seems to
18be fundamental tension between theories of black participation and strategies of successful black
agenda setting. Black participation research trumpets the importance of black consciousness to
mobilizing higher levels of black activism (Walton 1985; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989; Tate
1994; Dawson 1994); yet studies of black agenda setting stress the necessity of gaining broader non-
black support for black issues to become public policy (McClain 1993; Lee 2002). In this paper,
that tension results in an insigniﬁcant relationship between participation and policymaking. Future
research needs to think more carefully about how strategies of black agenda setting correspond to
strategies of political mobilization. Alternatively, these ﬁndings could reﬂect the long-standing
argument that institutionalized politics is simply not e ective at securing policy responsiveness for
black issues. Instead, greater attention should be given to the potential inﬂuence of protest activity
(Smith 1992). The basic point is that whenever we study individuals’ decisions to participate in
politics, we must begin with a basic question: participation for what?
19Appendices
A Tables of Coe cients for Each Type of Participation
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
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(-0.005/0.023) (-0.007/0.008) (-0.001/0.000) (-0.001/0.005)
Reagan Threat 0.067 0.038 0.015 0.016
(0.041/0.093) (0.022/0.054) (0.008/0.025) (0.008/0.023)
Access
Black Bills 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.001
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Table 1: The Impact of Opportunities on Black Participation: These are the ﬁrst di erences in the predicted
probabilities of participation given a standard deviation from the baseline. Columns are labeled by the dependent
variable. Bold entries indicate statistical signiﬁcance, and the parentheses contain the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Base Organization 0.826 0.341 0.027 0.157
(0.810/0.841) (0.280/0.403) (0.018/0.040) (0.117/0.203)
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Percent Conservative 0.831 0.346 0.020 0.164
(0.808/0.852) (0.261/0.425) (0.011/0.034) (0.107/0.227)
Table 2: The Interaction E ects of Organizational Activity: These are ﬁrst di erences when an individual becomes
involved in organizational activity and there is a standard deviation increase in the row variables. Bold entries mark
an enhanced e ect for those involved in organizational activity.
31Participation Petitions Party Rally
Base Education 0.174 0.124 0.007 0.031
(0.140/0.210) (0.102/0.146) (0.002/0.015) (0.018/0.046)
Black Unemployment 0.183 0.141 0.011 0.032
(0.127/0.240) (0.105/0.177) (0.001/0.031) (0.012/0.057)
Reagan Threat 0.135 0.105 -0.005 0.024
(0.110/0.162) (0.086/0.125) (-0.018/0.005) (0.011/0.038)
Black Bills 0.176 0.122 0.002 0.022
(0.142/0.213) (0.097/0.148) (-0.000/0.006) (0.012/0.033)
Black Chairs 0.160 0.127 0.007 0.029
(0.111/0.215) (0.095/0.161) (0.001/0.020) (0.013/0.049)
Percent Conservative 0.177 0.131 0.010 0.027
(0.131/0.224) (0.102/0.161) (0.002/0.024) (0.012/0.047)
Table 3: The Interaction E ects of Education: These are ﬁrst di erences when an individual’s education rises by
one level and there is a standard deviation increase in the row variables. Bold entries mark an enhanced e ect for
those with higher education levels.
32Participation Petitions
Base Income 0.721 0.743
(0.592/0.801) (0.509/0.874)
Black Unemployment 0.734 0.770
(0.565/0.814) (0.455/0.898)
Reagan Threat 0.738 0.840
(0.709/0.761) (0.797/0.865)
Black Bills 0.782 0.837
(0.724/0.819) (0.730/0.889)
Black Chairs 0.531 0.494
(0.141/0.784) (0.044/0.855)
Percent Conservative 0.742 0.710
(0.574/0.825) (0.356/0.885)
Table 4: The Interaction E ects of Income: These are ﬁrst di erences when an individual’s income rises by one
standard deviation and there is a standard deviation increase in the row variables. Bold entries mark an enhanced
e ect for those with higher income levels.
33Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.363 0.354 0.288 0.606
(0.923) (0.911) (0.918) (0.914)
Political Participation
Participation 0.001
(0.013)
Rally -0.029
(0.028)
Petition 0.020
(0.018)
Party -0.083
(0.042)
Access
Percent Conservative 0.027 0.031 0.025 0.028
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Black Chairs 0.005 0.012 -0.005 0.010
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
Black Bills 0.026 0.022 0.029 0.022
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
N 58 58 58 58
Likelihood -243.38 -243.94 -243.98 -245.39
Table 5: Relationship Between Congressional Hearings and Black Participation: The cell entries are standard
poisson coe cients. Each model includes a di erent measure of black participation. The collinearity between these
measures was too great for them all to be included within one model.
34Table 6: Results – General Participation
Intercept Organization Income Education Age
Intercept -1.011 -103.947 -0.162 0.910 -0.104
(0.927) (31.80) (1.113) (1.002) (0.194)
Unemployment 0.021 0.653 0.018 0.010 0.006
(0.023) (0.780) (0.022) (0.022) (0.004)
Reagan 0.415 -13.552 0.129 -0.142 -0.008
(0.096) (2.089) (0.115) (0.109) (0.020)
Bills Introduced 0.003 -0.277 0.014 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.182) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Allies -0.014 2.052 -0.029 -0.019 -0.002
(0.013) (0.454) (0.015) (0.013) (0.002)
Conservative -0.018 2.034 0.023 0.006 0.002
(0.022) (0.695) (0.026) (0.023) (0.004)
N 58 58 58 58 58
deviance 0.004 88.136 0.007 0.010 9.49e-06
35Table 7: Results – Petitions
Intercept Organization Income Education Age
Intercept -1.791 0.655 0.687 0.642 -0.017
(0.934) (1.868) (1.374) (0.885) (0.234)
Unemployment -0.001 0.003 0.022 0.015 0.002
(0.021) (0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.004)
Reagan 0.377 -0.280 0.180 -0.175 -0.030
(0.097) (0.198) (0.153) (0.099) (0.024)
Bills Introduced 0.010 -0.035 0.017 -0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
Allies -0.012 0.021 -0.035 -0.007 -0.001
(0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012) (0.003)
Conservative -0.009 0.030 -0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.021) (0.044) (0.032) (0.020) (0.005)
N 58 58 58 58 58
deviance 0.006 0.094 0.016 0.009 1.79e-5
36Table 8: Results – Party Work
Intercept Organization Income Education Age
Intercept 9.776 6.321 5.701 -16.772 -2.425
(5.214) (5.003) (3.188) (6.395) (0.712)
Unemployment -0.116 0.041 -0.135 0.080 0.012
(0.115) (0.107) (0.070) (0.137) (0.015)
Reagan 2.773 -0.111 -0.064 -1.261 -0.356
(0.432) (0.586) (0.311) (0.537) (0.064)
Bills Introduced 0.081 -0.031 0.042 -0.185 -0.013
(0.029) (0.032) (0.018) (0.035) (0.004)
Allies -0.391 0.041 -0.005 0.182 0.040
(0.075) (0.073) (0.0.041) (0.081) (0.009)
Conservative -0.248 -0.133 -0.112 0.461 0.057
(0.125) (0.127) (0.075) (0.152) (0.017)
N 58 58 58 58 58
deviance 2.133 2.319 0.372 3.251 0.001
37Table 9: Results – Rally Attendance
Intercept Organization Income Education Age
Intercept -2.827 1.445 1.644 4.586 -0.297
(1.839) (3.165) (1.585) (1.876) (0.379)
Unemployment 0.027 -0.097 -0.024 0.003 0.022
(0.042) (0.068) (0.036) (0.045) (0.009)
Reagan 0.681 0.180 0.400 -0.209 -0.069
(0.184) (0.332) (0.176) (0.206) (0.043)
Bills Introduced -0.007 0.020 0.009 0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002)
Allies -0.042 0.016 -0.065 -0.021 0.001
(0.026) (0.043) (0.020) (0.025) (0.005)
Conservative -0.022 0.051 -0.002 -0.095 0.001
(0.042) (0.070) (0.035) (0.041) (0.009)
N 58 58 58 58 58
deviance 0.066 0.349 0.043 0.111 0.0001
38